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We study the driving forces behind the adoption of environmental innovations (EI) in the Italian 
economy over 2006-2008 through empirical analyses of the new wave of Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) data that covered environmental innovation adoptions in different realms (energy, 
carbon, production, consumption, etc..). Given the shortage of studies that have empirically 
assessed the innovation effects of ETS at micro econometric level, we investigate whether the first 
phase of EU ETS (started in 2005-2006) has exerted some effects on environmental innovations. 
We then include in a typical probit innovation function some policy stringency indicators, for the 
ETS sectors, to verify whether the likelihood of adopting environmental innovations is stimulated 
among other factors by the ETS lever. We test a wide and comprehensive set of potential drivers, 
including internal factors (R&D), external (to the firm) factors (cooperation, networking), 
international drivers (foreign related relationships), and mostly important, the dynamic incentives to 
innovation eventually provided by the ETS implementation. Estimates show that external forces and 
complementarity with other management practices are particularly relevant to increase the adoption 
of relatively new and radical technologies: relationships with other firms and institutions, local 
public funding, group membership are the key factors in this sense. Training is also positively 
related to EI, confirming recent evidence. The role of ETS on EI seems instead to be weak, but it 
turns out to be significant for energy efficiency innovations and for consumption level/good related 
reductions of atmospheric and water emissions. 
 
Keywords: environmental innovation, industrial sectors, ETS, innovation drivers, CIS data. 
 
JEL: C21, L2, O33, Q38, Q55 
                                                 
*  The authors would like to thank seminar participants at the International Workshop on Evaluating Innovation Policy: 
Methods and Applications (EUNIP, 5-6/5/2011, Florence), at the SIEP (Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica, 
Pavia, 19-20/9/2011), and the SIE (Società Italiana degli Economisti, Rome, 14-15/10/2011). The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
** University of Siena, Faculty of Political Science, Department of Law, Economics and Government, via Mattioli 10, 
53100 Siena 
*** University of Padova, Department of Economics, via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova. 
†  Corresponding author: Massimiliano Mazzanti, University of Ferrara, Faculty of Economics, Department of 
Economics Institutions Territory, Via Voltapaletto 11, 44121, Ferrara. Tel: 0532 455066, Fax: 0532293012, E-mail: 
mzzmsm@unife.it. 1 Introduction: environmental innovations and
the EU ETS
The socio economic analysis of environmental innovations (EI) (Rennings, 2000;
Krozer and Nentjes, 2006) is based on both the evolution of various empirical
research directions on innovations drivers and on the theoretical literature re-
garding the dynamics of EI and the investigation of the environmental and eco-
nomic performances e⁄ects of environmental innovations. The literature that
studies the dynamics of environmental innovation has developed on a theoreti-
cal ground on both classic research issues of environmental economics studying
the static and dynamic e¢ ciency of regulatory instruments (economic vs com-
mand and control, ￿scal tools and emission trading), thus including the e⁄ects
of (technological, mainly emission abatement tools) innovation spurred by the
regulatory stimulus (Hahn and Stavins, 1994; Goulder and Parry, 2008), and on
more recent analyses evolving within evolutionary economics (Mulder and Van
den Bergh, 2001), intrinsically focused on the co-evolution of innovation, pol-
icy and economic dynamics in socio-bio-economic systems (Kemp, 1997). The
structural theme of innovation endogeneity is crucial and links the analysis of
innovation drivers to the realm of the e⁄ects of innovations (Pizer and Popp,
2009). The empirical literature is fed by the theoretical reasoning in testing
the hypotheses on e¢ ciency (but also e⁄ectiveness in a less mainstream per-
spective of ex post evaluation, Millock and Nauges, 2006; Bruvoll et al., 2003)
of economic and policy drivers (Johnstone, 2007). The theoretical paradigm is
based on both mainstream and heterodox approaches (van den Bergh, 2007).
The motivations of environmental innovations (Sterner and Turnheim, 2008;
Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009b; Horbach, 2009; Rennings et al., 2003; Frondel at
al 2004), but also the complementarity nexus between drivers (Mohnen and
Roller, 2005; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008) with other organisational innovations
of environmental nature, such as EMS/auditing schemes (Harrington et al.,
2007; Arimura et al., 2008; Frondel et al. 2004; Wagner, 2007, 2008; Johnstone
and Labonne, 2009) are studied. On the level of economic and environmen-
tal performances of EI, the starting point is the well known Porter hypothesis
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) on the competitive advantages that may de-
rive in the long run from investments in environmental innovations (that may
anticipate or being just compliant with policies) or more in general from strate-
gies which are not (only) based on cost reduction management options, but are
aimed at investing on ￿rm assets following the paradigm of corporate social
responsability (CSR, Reinhardt F. Stavins R: Vietor R., 2008; Margolis et al.
2007). Key factors are techno organisational innovations, training/human cap-
ital, workers and unions involvement in strategic innovative decisions, workers
conditions regarding health, safety and stress. The aim is one of increasing
long term pro￿tability by means of complementary investments in technolog-
ical and human capital, and the production of impure public goods linked to
innovation processes (Kotchen, 2005; Rubbelke and Markandya, 2008). Envi-
ronmental performances and workers conditions are thus characterized as the
1public components of such investments in goods with mixed private and pub-
lic feature, driven by both the rents associated to the private element and by
the eventual policy stimulus tackling the public value/objective. Pro￿t based
and public objectives are brought together and strictly intertwined. The inves-
tigation of e⁄ects and relationships of EIs with the socio economic objectives
internal and external to ￿rm boundaries is a key aspect in current research di-
rections (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009). Higher value of research emerges if one
jointly studies innovation drivers and innovation e⁄ects, often addressed sep-
arately. On empirical grounds, a robust dynamic and integrated reasoning is
possible by exploiting panel data or diachronic (lagged) cross section data.
As far as contents are concerned, research values may today emerge if one
addresses the various (and new) aspects that regard the synergy and integration
of circumscribed analyses of environmental innovations with a larger conceptual
scenario (Mazzanti and Montini, 2010). The issues and not yet tested hypothe-
ses emerging in the literature are many (Del Rio, 2009; Van den Bergh, 2007)
and contribute to de￿ne a value added for environmental innovation analyses
(e⁄ects and driving forces). Among the others, we list the most fruitful. A key
element that has not been fully touched is the relationship between environ-
mental innovation adoptions and the status of workers conditions in a ￿rm, an
issue that links labour and environmental economics. It deserves attention since
it links two of the main social bene￿ts a CSR ￿rm may produce: environmen-
tal public goods and bene￿ts for workers/citizens of a territory, in addition to
its core targets of pro￿tability, productivity (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009a, b).
Then, it creates a bridge between external public (local and global) bene￿ts of
environmental innovations (lower emissions, higher energy e¢ ciency, lower ma-
terial ￿ ows) and ￿ internal￿public bene￿ts, such as health and safety in workers
conditions.
The empirical studies that have investigated the drivers of environmental
innovations (Horbach, 2008; Horbach and Oltra, 2010) have mostly reasoned
around the internal and external ￿ to the ￿rm ￿ factors that can trigger EI
in national or regional systems, where external factors range from cooperative
behaviour to the internalisation structure and relationships of the organiza-
tion (Cainelli et al., 2011a). Another bulk of the literature has focused on
the co-causative relationships and complementarities among various typologies
of environmental-innovations (techno, EMS, ISO, etc..) and between EI and
other types of EI (Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Wagner, 2008, 2007, 2009, 2003;
Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008; Cainelli et al., 2011b). Some new studies that use
(German) EI data have very recently tried to assess the long run policy e⁄ects
(Rennings and Rexhauser, 2010).
The innovation e⁄ects of (the EU) ETS (Convery, 2009; Ellerman et al.,
2010), a potential major pathbreaking event for environmental innovation dy-
namics in Europe, though have bee extensively analysed and compared to other
environmental policies at theoretical level (see also Carraro et al., 2010), have
not found so far a consolidated empirical testing even in relation to the ￿rst
pilot phase 2005-2007. Many studies have emerged, but in our eyes though of-
fering good insights, they often rely on case studies and small sample sizes. we
2attempt to cover this possible weakness and complement such studies that we
survey below.
On a general level of resoning, Borghesi (2011) conceptually touches upon
the innovation e⁄ects of ETS in his description of ETS allocation and func-
tioning in the past, current and future scenarios. Kemp (2010) and Kemp and
Pontoglio (2011) include some re￿ ections on ETS innovation e⁄ects in their EI
related works. A lack of empirical e⁄ort is also highlighted in such studies,
largely due to lack of ￿rm level data on both innovation and policy sides. Truly,
the past years witnessed the appearance of some micro based study that coun-
terbalanced the prevalence of macro based simulation studies focusing on carbon
pricing and its economic and environmental e⁄ects (Alberola et al., 2009, 2008;
Tole, 2011). Taschini (2011) is a noteworthy example of a theoretical study
that addresses the technological adoption features of ETS development, though
it still relies on simulation analysis. On the other side of the literature ￿case
sector studies based on interviews to managers and ￿rms ￿we note the two
studies by Pontoglio (2010) on the paper and card board sector in Italy, which
￿nds weak if not negligible ETS e⁄ect on EI, and the study on some German
sectors by Rogge et al. (2011)1. They ￿nd that ￿ the innovation impact of the
EU ETS has remained limited so far because of the scheme￿ s initial lack of
stringency and predictability and the relatively greater importance of context
factors. Additionally, the impact varies signi￿cantly across technologies, ￿rms,
and innovation dimensions and is most pronounced for R&D on carbon capture
technologies and organizational changes. Our analysis suggests that the EU
ETS on its own may not provide su¢ cient incentives for fundamental changes
in corporate innovation activities at a level which ensures political long-term
targets can be achieved. In a similar study based on 42 business interviews to
the Germany power sector companies, Rogge and Ho⁄mann (2010) ￿nd that
the EU ETS mainly a⁄ects the rate and direction of technological change of
power generation technologies within the large-scale, coal-based power genera-
tion technological regime, to which carbon capture technologies are added as a
new technological trajectory￿ . Schmidt et al. (2010) also study through busi-
ness surveys the innovation e⁄ects of ETS in the EU power sector, concluding
that ￿ the EU ETS has limited e⁄ect on the innovation activities (adoption and
R&D) of both users and producers of power generation technologies. However,
the perception of long-term GHG reduction targets has a signi￿cant in￿ uence
on all innovation dimensions￿ .
Similar insights are presented by Muuls and Martin (2011) who present em-
pirical evidence by using quali￿ed interviews to ￿rm managers in six European
countries. This is an extensive study providing qualitative and quantitative ev-
idence. On a general basis they ￿nd that 30% of ￿rms have joined the ETS
passively, and that sector di⁄erences overwhelm cross country di⁄erences in this
behaviour. Some econometric evidence is provided in relation to the e⁄ect on
innovation adoption of process and product innovations of ￿ ETS stringency indi-
1Tomas et al. (2010) instead analyse the e⁄ects on the Portoguese chemical sector, ￿nding
weak evidence for costs increaes and competitiveness costs.
3cators￿ . Those share some similarity to our approach and tend to capture current
and future (expected) stringency (mainly through expected prices). Some are
dummy variable, just indicating whether a ￿rm is part or not of the ETS mech-
anisms. The evidence is very mixed. In particular, if on the one hand there
is poor evidence that ETS ￿rms di⁄er from non ETS ￿rms regarding process
and product innovations, some higher signi￿cance is found for the e⁄ect of the
expected stringency of the cap. This is consistent with the lack of early mov-
ing behaviour in the ￿rst phase, which is instead possible in the current phase,
where ￿rms may want to anticipate future rises in prices. In fact the most ro-
bust ￿nding is that for product but also process innovations, the stringency in
ETS phase III seems relevant as innovation drivers. This highlights that the
choices of ￿rms to engage in R&D and other innovation activities may be not
independent on the mechanism of allocation of allowances.
Dechezlepretre and Calel (2011) present a detailed survey of recent works.
They state that ￿ some report that the EU ETS has had a strong positive e⁄ect
on low-carbon innovation￿ . For instance, Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) reported
on a few early case studies, concluding that the EU ETS was already having a
substantial impact on innovation. This is a rare study that asserts that ETS had
an e⁄ect in terms of early moving behaviour. Uncertainty on future scenarios
and price volatility are nevertheless key facts hampering environmental inno-
vation. The uncertainty issue is highlighted by Gronwald and Ketterer (2011)
who study evolution of EU ETS prices, ￿nding considerable jumps and unex-
pected movements. This peculiar pattern may have generated a postponement
of abatement decisions that are undermined by excessive uncertainty.
Within a rather pessimistic view over the innovative properties of ETS in
the ￿rst phase, some of the mentioned studies have found some e⁄ects, though
proper ex post evaluation lack. An interesting exercise along such a line of
research is shown by Di Maria and Jaraite (2011), who apply ex post policy
evaluation techniques such as matching estimators to analyse whether ETS had
an impact in its ￿rst phase. He ￿nds coherently with other evidence that ETS
had not a signi￿cant impact on CO2 emissions (thus implicitly on innovation
as well, though Anderson et al. (2011), conducting a survey of Irish ￿rms
included in the trading scheme, ￿nd that the EU ETS has been somewhat e⁄ec-
tive in stimulating a moderate technological change). The study is nevertheless
based on a quite limited number of ￿rms of Ireland and Lithuania. A similar ￿
in approach ￿study (Dechezlepretre and Calel, 2011) extends the coverage to
Belgium, Britain, France and Germany (with 233 observations), and ￿nds that
￿rms regulated by EU ETS have innovated more with respect to unregulated
￿rms, both on general terms and speci￿cally in the realm of low carbon tech-
nology2. This study is nevertheless not comparable with ours, given the use of
patents, instead of innovation adoption.
What it lacks in the literature is a robust econometric exercise on a relevant
EU industry. Italy is major industrial country that can o⁄er such possibility.
2￿First, we analyse the timing of _￿rms￿reaction to the creation of the EU ETS. We _￿nd
that companies anticipated the launch of the ETS by increasing their innovative activity,
mainly in low-carbon technologies￿.
4Compared to case studies and small sized samples, an econometric application
to a large relevant sample can complementary tell us whether an empirical
regularity exists, once one has controlled for various (size, sectoral) factors and
the multiple drivers of EI.3
As a consequence of the recent evolution of the literature on ETS e⁄ects on
innovation, the main and original objectives of the paper are (i) to analyse the
innovation e⁄ects of EU ETS by exploiting the new release of CIS5 2006-2008,
that hosts for the ￿rst time environmental innovation data for Italy and other
countries (Germany, France); (ii) to provide evidence for both environmental
innovations on the production side of the e⁄ects (energy, CO2 abatement) and
on the consumption side (environmental improvements occuring over the prod-
uct life), (iii) to construct a new and pragmatic ETS strincency indicator by
merging sector environmental accounting data with allowances allocation. ￿-
nally, we originally sustain the empirical analysis by means of a ￿ evolutionary
based￿theoretical model that deals with environmental innovation adoptions by
￿rms as the alternative to standard more polluting technologies.
Though focusing on ETS, we assess environmental innovation drivers in
a wide de￿nition of possible internal, external to the ￿rm and policy related
drivers.
We speci￿cally aim at assessing the innovation e⁄ects of ETS, thus implicitly
highlighting policy but also sector speci￿c EI e⁄ects. We test the ETS e⁄ect
with speci￿c reference to the start up phase, that is the e⁄ect of the 2005 alloca-
tion of quotas on the adoption of EI over 2006-2008, the period of the ￿fth CIS.
Doing this, we could also capture some anticipatory behavior by some ￿rms and
sectors, given that the ETS proposal for a Directive and the Directive itself date
back to 2002 and 2003. In terms of methodology, we set up a theoretical evo-
lutionary model that analyses the innovation choice of ￿rms / sectors. This is
the conceptual reference for the investigation of EI as a phenomenon driven by
￿rm behaviour and policy levers. To assess the role of policies (ETS), we then
construct some environmental policy indexes at sector level (policy stringency),
by using data derived from the 2005 allocation of ETS quotas by the Ministry
of the environment and emissions data derived from the NAMEA source (Is-
tat hybrid economic environmental accounting). The allocation procedure left
space to national states as far as sector quota allocation was concerned in the
￿rst phase (Cl￿, 2008; Woerdman et al 2008). This caused di⁄erent stringency
depending mainly on the allocated quota and the historical emission level as-
sociated to sectors. On that conceptual basis, we then analyse by probit and
two stages Heckman model the probability that ETS triggered environmental
3The study by Rogge et al. (2011) opens the way to our analysis in its conclusions that
are worth reporting: "As we focused our analysis on the power sector, other studies will have
to identify whether and how the innovation impact of the EU ETS di⁄ers across sectors. Ad-
ditionally, all of our case companies were based in Germany ￿though often with international
operations ￿so it might be useful to investigate whether companies with other home markets
have reacted similarly to the EU ETS [...]. Finally, while our qualitative approach enabled
us to study the complex causal links and feedback loops of innovation processes in the power
sector and how the EU ETS is impacting them, innovation surveys allowing for statistical
generalisations should complement this analysis."
5innovation in 2006-2008. The paper thus contributes to the existing literature
providing evidence at ￿rm based level though engraving the ￿rm within a sector
environment, which is coherent with seminal works (using CIS data) such as
Breschi et al. (2000). Sector speci￿city is relevant from both the innovation
(e.g. technological regimes) and the policy perspectives. Conceptually and em-
pirically, the merge of micro and meso elements allows to enrich the analysis of
sector-related structural forces with micro based heterogeneity and detail.
Of interest to our study, given that it is a rare (if not the only) study on ETS
e⁄ects based on a CIS survey, is the work by Aghion et al. (2009) who show that
￿ improving energy e¢ ciency￿and ￿ reducing environmental impact or improved
health and safety￿are the lowest ranking motives for innovation. Given that the
Directive was launched in 2003, their study can actually be seen as a test on
the absence of early behaviour by ￿rms. Di⁄erently from that work, we instead
test an e⁄ect of the implementation itself in the really pilot phase 2005-2007.
The implementation of 2005 and the 2003 Directive, in our case, are assumed to
have an impact on 2006-2008 innovations. This allows to have a clear time lag,
without any overlapping between the ￿ policy dose￿and the ￿ innovation response￿ .
The present paper thus contributes to the literature dealing with environ-
mental innovation drivers, using for the ￿rst time environmental innovation data
at national level for testing the innovation e⁄ects of ETS policy. Di⁄erently from
other CIS studies, moreover, our work proposes a theoretical framework that
can cast light on the forces underlying the di⁄usion of innovation, which is the
typical issue dealt with by CIS based studies. We thus investigate the drivers of
innovation di⁄usion at both theoretical and empirical level, with emphasis on
policy related drivers.
The paper is structured as follows. Paragraph 2 sketches a theoretical model
that depicts the innovation choice of ￿rms between green and brown options.
Paragraph 3 explains the rationale behind the construction of policy stringency
ETS related indicators. Paragraph 4 presents the econometric analyses of en-
vironmental innovation using CIS 2006-2008 data. Paragraph 5 contains some
concluding remarks on the main results that emerge from the analysis.
2 The theoretical model
Let us consider a population of ￿rms whose number is normalised to 1. Each
￿rm has to choose whether: (i) to use an old, polluting technology and buy the
corresponding pollution permits that are needed for its economic activity or (ii)
to shift to a new, environmental-friendly technology that requires no pollution
permits to operate. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the ￿rm￿ s out-
put and revenues R remain unchanged whatever the adopted technology. Stated
di⁄erently, we assume that in the present context environmental-innovation con-
sists of a cleaner process technology which does not imply higher production
e¢ ciency (i.e. higher output per unit of input). Finally, let us assume that the
cost of the new, non polluting technology (cNP) is higher than the cost of the
6old, polluting technology (cP):
cNP > cP > 0
Each ￿rm has, therefore, to choose between two alternative strategies:
1) keep on using the old technology and buy pollution permits
2) invest in the innovation technology which implies higher costs but sets
the ￿rm free from having to purchase the pollution permits.
Let the variable x(t) denote the share of ￿rms choosing strategy 1 (i.e. that
purchase pollution permits) at time t, 0 ￿ x(t) ￿ 1.
Indicating with ￿k k = 1;2 the correspondent pay-o⁄s, we have:
￿1 = R ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)QP
￿2 = R ￿ cNP
where: Pp(x) indicates the price of the pollution permits, which is a strictly
increasing function of the number of ￿rms that demand them, and QP denotes
the quantity of permits purchased by the ￿rm that keeps using the old technol-
ogy.
The process of adopting strategies is modelled by the so called replicator
dynamics (Weibull, 1995), according to which the strategy whose expected pay-
o⁄s are greater than the average payo⁄ spread within the populations at the
expense of the alternative strategy:
￿
x = x(￿1 ￿ ￿)
where
￿ = x ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿2
is the average payo⁄ of the population of ￿rms.
From the equations above, it turns out that the replication dynamics can be
written as follows:
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)(￿1 ￿ ￿2) = x(1 ￿ x)[cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)QP]
Notice that if [cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)QP] > 0, then the payo⁄ of strategy 1 is
higher than that of strategy 2, so that a higher number of ￿rms will decide to
keep on using the old technology (
￿
x > 0). This will increase in its turn the
price of pollution permits, thus reducing the gap between the payo⁄s of the
two strategies. If, on the contrary, [cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)QP] < 0, strategy 2 is
more remunerative than strategy 1. In this case, therefore, a higher number of
￿rms will shift towards the innovative technology (
￿
x < 0), which decreases the
pollution price. The process will go on as long as [cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)QP] < 0
until the term between brackets get to zero, so that each ￿rm is indi⁄erent
between the two alternative strategies.
From the replication dynamics above, it follows that three possible equilibria
can occur in the model, namely the two extreme steady states:
(i) x = 0 in which all ￿rms adopt the innovative technology
(ii) x = 1 in which no ￿rm adopts the innovative technology
7and an internal equilibrium in which some ￿rms adopt the new technology
while others keep on using the old technology. More precisely, the latter case
will occur if:
(iii) 9x￿ such that cNP ￿ cP = Pp(x￿)QP
Observe that the internal equilibrium x￿ is a sink (attractor), while the two
extreme equilibria x = 0 and x = 1 are sources (repellors). As a matter of fact,
as it can easily veri￿ed:
if 0 < x < x￿ then
￿
x > 0, while x > x￿ we have
￿
x < 0:
It follows that, whatever the initial share of ￿rms that buy the pollution
permits, the system will always converge towards the stable internal equilibrium
x￿.
The simple analytical framework proposed above can be easily extended to
examine the innovation choices performed at the sector level. Consider, for
instance, a generic sector i that is included in the EU-ETS. The dynamics of
the permits demand (i.e. the share of ￿rms that purchase permits) in sector i
will be given by:
￿
xi = xi(1 ￿ xi)(￿1i ￿ ￿2i) = xi(1 ￿ xi)
2






where index j denotes any other sector regulated by the ETS legislation
beyond sector i.
Notice that while the innovation process is sector-speci￿c, the permit price
is common to all the ETS sectors, therefore it is in￿ uenced by the aggregate
demand of all the ￿rms operating in all sectors involved in the ETS.
Indicating with ￿ci = cNP;i ￿ cP;i the di⁄erential cost between the new
and the old technology in sector i and assuming that all ￿rms have a linear
inverse demand function for pollution permits, there exists an inner equilibrium
x￿ = (x￿
i;x￿







In the following we use the model as a reference to test the ETS e⁄ect on
(sector) innovation. Next section is devoted to the explanation of how to set up
sound ETS sector speci￿c stringency indicators.
3 ETS stringency indicators
We construct a series of ETS policy indicators that are aimed at capturing
the stringency of the policy in its ￿rst allocation phase. We exploit two main
8sources of information: the NAMEA sector emission data (Tudini and Vetrella,
2011) released by ISTAT (over 1990-2008, we exploit 2000-2005 data) and the
information on the allocation decision provided by o¢ cial documents of the
Italian ministry of the environment (Ministero dell￿ ambiente, 2006).
Our measures of stringency are basically two, with some ancillary modi￿ca-
tions that in both cases are aimed at implementing a sensitivity analysis. The
use of multiple indexes is in any case a way to carry out a sensitivity analysis.
The two indicators tell the same story from a slightly di⁄erent perspective.
The ￿rst indicator is the following:
s1 = T ￿ si ￿ EUAi
where EUAi = tradable permits (European Union Allowances) of sector i;
T = national emission target (Kyoto target: given that we use 2005 as pivotal
year, we have weighted the Italian -6.5% reduction accordingly, thus taking in
the calculation 2/3 of the total target of Italy; si = ei=
P
ej = emission share
of sector i; ei = emissions of sector i;
P
ej = total emissions
The second indicator that can be used as an alternative to the ￿rst one is
the following:
s2 = ei=EUAi
To highlight the connection between the indicators s1 and s2, notice that
the former may also be rewritten as follows:
s1bis = [T ￿ s2 ￿ EUAi]=
P
ej ￿ EUAi or, equivalently,
s1bis = EAUi[(T ￿ s2)=
P
ej ￿ 1]
As far as s2 is concerned, we have constructed three alternatives: (i) 2005
NAMEA emissions / allocated quotas, (ii) 2000-2005 average NAMEA emissions
/ allocated quotas (iii) Ministry of the environment reported 2000 emissions /
allocated quotas; (i) is chosen as main indicator.
Concerning s1, we have de￿ned a version taking 2005 as benchmark year for
the Kyoto target (2/3 of total reduction) and a version with the proper ￿nal
Kyoto target of -6.5%.
Then, s1bis was also calculated taking both NAMEA 2000-2005 average emis-
sions and the Ministry of the environment emissions.
In the econometric analysis that follows we will run regressions using a
dummy variable that takes value 1 for sectors under the ETS (DE1 ￿paper
and cardboard without printing branch; DF, DI, DJ) and value 0 for all other
sectors. When the dummy takes value 1, we then compute stringency indicators
mentioned above. The use of both the ETS dummy and the stringency indica-
tors among the EI regressors allows to distinguish the impact on the EI deriving
from the presence of the ETS from the e⁄ect generated by the stringency of the
regulation. The values of all stringency indicators by sector are available upon
request.
3One can reasonably expect that the most polluting sectors show the highest stringency
indicators. This seems to be con￿rmed by the available data: as a matter of fact, the most
polluting sector (DI) is besides one case the sector that presents the most stringent allocation
in our dataset.
94 The empirical framework
4.1 The data and the model
In order to analyse the drivers of EI in the Italian manufacturing industry and
test the innovation e⁄ect of ETS, we exploit three sources of data. The main
source is represented by the CIS dataset (5th wave), that for the ￿rst time
covers environmental innovation adoptions, coherently with the de￿nition of EI
developed by the Measuring environmental innovation (MEI) project funded
by the EU 6th Framework programme (Kemp, 2010). Descriptive statistics
on the sample of ￿rms (6,843 ￿rms in total) and on the distribution of EI by
dimensional class and sector are available upon request.4 A similar (CIS like)
survey on EI and other innovation practices for the Emilia Romagna, a strongly
industrialised region of Italy is used in Cainelli et al. (2011a, b). In what follows
we will highlight similarities between the two set of results when sound.
In addition, in order to set up the ETS policy stringency indicator, we exploit
two additional sources, as also indicated above: the NAMEA emissions (2005,
and 2000-2005 to capture medium run trend) and the Italian allocation of ETS
quotas by sector. Those two sources of sector data are merged with ￿rm data. In
absence of ￿rm data this procedure is quite standard, as in Cole et al. (2009),
who merge wage individual data and ￿rm pollution data, and Cainelli et al.
(2010). Cluster correction is needed in such cases.
We use dprobit as our estimator tool to study the probability of adoption,
given that our EI variables are speci￿ed as dichotomous indexes. Dprobit ￿ts
with maximum-likelihood probit models and is an alternative to probit. Rather
than reporting the coe¢ cients, dprobit reports the marginal e⁄ects, that is, the
changes in the probability of an in￿nitesimal change in each independent, con-
tinuous variable and, by default, reports the discrete changes in the probability
for the dummy variables. Table 1 provides a brief explanation for the main
factors tested. The full descriptive statistics are available upon request.
Our econometric model is based on the following probit speci￿cation:
Pr(Yi = 1=X) = ￿(X0￿)
where ￿ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution and Yi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if ￿rm i introduces an
environmental innovation and 0 otherwise. X is the set of covariates described
in table 1.
4.2 Econometric evidence
We present results for the EI drivers ￿rst focusing on EI related to ￿ material
per unit of ouput￿ , ￿ reduction of CO2 emissions￿and ￿ energy use per unit of
output￿(bene￿ts on the production phase). This is the main level at which
we test the hypothesis that ETS stringency can eventually lead to innovation
4We thank ISTAT for the provision of data and the possibility to have access to original
sources to carry out estimates.
10e⁄ects, with a special interest on the second and third speci￿cations, given that
ETS is devoted to reduce carbon dioxide through abatement technologies and/or
energy reprocessing and changes to energy structure. Second, we also exploit
the EI information on technology adoptions that reduce impacts at the level of
￿ use of goods￿ : ￿ reduction of energy consumption￿ , ￿ reduction of emissions and
water and soil pollution￿ , ￿ Material, waste, water recycling￿ . The extension to
the second use oriented perspective is in line with a life cycle approach that does
not focus only on production but takes a ￿ from cradle to grave￿view of EI and
environmental performances.
4.2.1 Environmental innovations that produce bene￿ts at production
level
Tables 2 and 3 present outcomes for the ￿ production side￿of EI bene￿ts, where
3 dependent variables are utilised. We comment on internal, external to the
￿rm and policy correlated factors, including ETS policy stringency.
As far as ￿ internal sources￿are concerned, we note that R&D expenditures
are never signi￿cant (con￿rming results obtained by Cainelli et al. 2011a, b and
Horbach and Oltra, 2010). Speci￿c environmental R&D is probably needed,
whereas the lack of signi￿cance of R&D is in our eyes related to the fact that
R&D ends up with being in essence a proxy for absorptive capacity5. Training
activities are instead positively correlated to EI, with a peak of statistical sig-
ni￿cance in the case of energy e¢ ciency. This result is coherent with the strong
link between EI and training coverage that was also found for Emilia Romagna
￿rms in Cainelli et al. (2011a, b)6. Then, also productivity (in 2006) is as
expected a determinant of innovation in the following period. This evidence
recon￿rms that virtuous circles exist: environmental innovations are driven by
a core positive economic performance and could further contribute to enhance
the economic and environmental performance of the ￿rm.
External sources show to substantially matter in the way they add informa-
tion on the multiple sources behind EI adoption. While the innovation oriented
cooperation activities do not matter if taken in their aggregate level ￿further
estimates could be carried out on cooperation with speci￿c agents ￿a number
of ￿ information sources￿are relevant. Receiving information from other ￿rms of
the group is relevant for energy e¢ ciency; this reinforces the massive relevance
of being part of a group for all kind of innovations. This is extremely interesting
and con￿rms that EI is heavily engraved in networking relationships. It extends
to EI the coordinated strategy / group e⁄ects on R&D/ process and product
5As known in the evolutionary economics and innovation studies literature, R&D is often
a factor embodying the innovative (absorptive) capacity, rather than a deep internal e⁄ort by
the ￿rm towards the achievement of a comprehensive and environment speci￿c productivity
enhancement. It can thus be not a determinant of more radical forms of innovation and
performance (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997).
6We note that the non signi￿cance of export is also coherent with what found by Cainelli et
al. (2011a,b), who in addition highlight the role played by FDI and foreign ownership among
international drivers of EI.
11innovation adoptions that was found by using CIS data by Ce￿s et al. (2010) .
Suppliers also con￿rm to be relevant as source of EI (similar outcomes are
found by Cainelli et al. 2011a, b). The set of agents involved behind EI is
large. Information received from Universitities and public institutions also ap-
pear to impact on the likelihood to adopt EI, as well as information received
by attending fairies/conferences and by using the support o⁄ered by industrial
association services.
It is highly interesting to note that the ￿ information￿/ relational factor are
especially relevant for CO2 abatement. This is coherent with the ￿ public good￿
nature of CO2 that needs for abatement a sort of breakthrough technology
adoptions for which internal sources of the ￿rm are absolutely not su¢ cient.
Private and public support is a key factor there.
Finally, the role of policy variables is examined. The ￿ public￿support con-
￿rms to be a necessary part of the story to cope with CO2 externalities. In
fact, ￿rms which received public funding are more likely to adopt EI. This is
especially true, as expected, for energy e¢ ciency, and also CO2. The higher
signi￿cance of energy e¢ ciency may depend on the mixed public good nature:
public support also stimulate private investments. The weak signi￿cance for
CO2 alone may justify a re￿ ection on the possibility to increase public support.
This is even truer if we look at the result for the stringency ETS dummy,
which appears not relevant as EI explanatory factor. This means if we take a
sectoral level perspective that the sectors under the ETS umbrella (DE1, DF,
DI, DJ, see appendix) were not associated to higher EI adoptions over 2006-
2008. More interestingly, the ETS continuous stringency indicator that we test
in table 3 is also not relevant. Not only ETS sectors do not show a substantially
di⁄erent EI performance with respect to other manufacturing sectors, but their
￿ relative di⁄erence￿in terms of ETS stringency7 did not exert any in￿ uence.
EI were in the ￿rst phase of ETS still determined by ￿rm related and mostly
external to the ￿rm factors. The evidence con￿rm the expectations outlined by
works on the e⁄ects of EU ETS, and also sustain the case study evidence that
ETS ￿mostly depending on its price volatility and low level ￿was not a major
driver of EI.
We also note that this evidence tells us that such sectors, which had expec-
tations on the allocation quotas they would receive well before 2006, did not
take any type of ￿ early moving￿behaviour towards EI. They probably supposed
the Italian allocation would not be stringent, or not stringent enough or require
innovative e⁄orts beyond the status quo dynamics.
4.2.2 Environmental innovations that produce bene￿ts at consump-
tion/use of goods level
Tables 4 and 5 present evidence for the ￿ use phase￿bene￿ts of some EI (energy,
emissions, waste and materials). Relationships with other ￿rms in the group
7We tested all proxies identi￿ed in section 3. Indicators related to s2 were in the end most
signi￿cant than others if we consider together estimates in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Estimates
are nevertheless really preliminary at this stage.
12are still relevant, though the mere group membership appeared stronger in its
relevance in the production side of the tale. Among ￿ information related￿factors,
suppliers and private research institutions exert some signi￿cant positive e⁄ect
on EI. All in all, we may a¢ rm that information received from other agents and
the in￿ uence of business group membership is stronger for EI that exert bene￿ts
at the production level.
The evidence on internal and structural factors is basically similar to above,
with the slight exception of a weak R&D signi￿cance. Training is instead con-
￿rmed a pillar associated to the EI ￿rm strategy even in this case.
Things are di⁄erent as far as policy levers are concerned. At the use/consumption
level of EI, public funding is not relevant. As expected, public funding supports
production reprocessing and abatement, while it is less focused on life cycle
bene￿ts of products, which is also coherent with the very low share of Italian
￿rms that invest and adopt EMS.
We instead ￿nd both in table 4 (for EI ECOPOS and ECOREA) and table 5
(for EI ECOPOS) a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of ETS ￿ presence￿ , and ￿ stringency￿
as well. Sectors associated to ETS adopted more EI over 2006-2008 in the realms
of emission reductions, and recycling of material, waste and water. Furthermore,
the stronger the stringency of ETS (relatively to sectors DE, DF, DI, DJ), the
higher the likelihood of adopting EI for abating pollution emissions at the use
level of goods.
Contrary to expectations, ETS exert some innovative impacts not at the
production level of environmental bene￿ts but at the use / consumption level
of bene￿ts. The only case where we e⁄ectively ￿nd a very robust stringency de-
pendant e⁄ect of ETS is nevertheless the ￿ Water, soil and atmospheric emission
reduction (use phase bene￿t)￿ . It is worth noting that such statistical signif-
icance of ETS is robust since it is controlled for sector, size and geographical
features of the ￿rm.
Though not directly linked to CO2 reductions, then, ETS appear to be
among the signi￿cant EI correlated factors. An interpretation of this result
may be that if on the one hand the stringency (including credibility) of ETS
was not su¢ ciently high at least at the beginning of its development to stimulate
speci￿c carbon reduction technology adoptions, it triggered on the other hand
cheaper, less radical and less problematic EI investments. Those EI adoptions
that seem to be favoured by ETS related to use level emission and recycling.
Emission abatement is in the end complementary to CO2 abatement to a great
extent. Firms may start addressing the EI strategy from the ￿ safe￿side, that
is from innovation adoptions that are both relatively less radical ￿compared
to energy/CO2 ￿and importantly that were already associated to some envi-
ronmental regulations (e.g. EU CAFE for emissions, EU local regulations for
emission and water, waste regulations for packaging waste deriving from EU
directives). Thus, ETS seems to have exerted e⁄ects of indirect nature and on
EI already under regulation pressures. This appears to be the case of a carbon
related policy that has some e⁄ects of incremental nature, in top of existing
policy realms. We overall con￿rm the evidence provided by business surveys
and case studies: in order to witness signi￿cant EI e⁄ects directly stimulated
13by the EU ETS, higher stringency levels and thus higher and stable prices will
be needed.
5 Conclusions
We have attempted to provide ￿rst micro econometric evidence on the EI e⁄ects
of EU ETS by exploiting newly available Italian CIS data for manufacturing
￿rms. Building up on (i) a theoretical model that creates a simple analytical
framework where to analyze the levers behind the environmental innovative
decision of ￿rms in a regulated sector and (ii) the related construction of sector
speci￿c ETS stringency indicators, we investigate the policy induced EI e⁄ects
of ETS in an usual ￿ innovation function￿adoption approach. We then extend
the set of (typical) EI drivers ￿internal and external to the ￿rm EI correlated
factors to policy stimulus. We further address problems of ￿ omission of relevant
variables￿by introducing a potential relevant policy lever, and in the meanwhile
we control the policy e⁄ects for all structural factors characterizing the ￿rm and
all other EI levers. The eventual policy e⁄ect is then made robust.
Estimates are rich in results and present compelling evidence for EI for what
concerns both policy and ￿rm-related factors (internal and external). They
show and con￿rm that environmental innovations are driven by a set of multi-
ple factors, internal and external to the ￿rm. External forces seem to be mostly
relevant to increase the adoption of relatively new and radical technologies. If on
the one hand internal R&D does not in￿ uence EI, relationships with other ￿rms
and institutions, local public funding, group membership are the key factors. It
is worth noting that a high performance practice such as training is positively
related to EI, con￿rming recent evidence. As far as ETS is concerned, it seems
that its role is weak, but signi￿cant for energy e¢ ciency innovations (not for
CO2) and for consumption level / good related reductions of atmospheric and
water emissions. Environmental innovations emerge and con￿rm to be an inno-
vation phenomenon that is highly embedded in what the ￿rm does outside its
formal boundaries. External forces, complementarity with other management
practices, and policy appear to consistently matter for its adoption in industrial
￿rms.
Overall, the suggestions deriving from works that have addressed the EU
ETS concrete role as EI driver, at least in its ￿rst phase, and the evidence
o⁄ered by case studies, is con￿rmed by our micro econometric analysis on major
industrial countries.
Recent interview with the ETS responsible of the Italian Industry association
(Con￿ndustria) provides information that justi￿es the light impact of the policy
on innovation dynamics. Within a framework that has been characterised more
by compliance than innovative behaviour, besides the energy sector, ￿rms have
operated ￿ wait and see￿strategies. Most of the ￿rms have bought quotas so far
and tend not to sell them in front of future uncertainties on targets, mechanisms
and prices. Great e⁄ort has been placed on lobbying actions to be included in
the ￿ free auction￿share of ￿rms in the new ETS phase. This ￿ wait and see￿
14behaviour has also been fuelled by the small size of ￿rms, for example in the
ceramic and paper & card board sectors. This calls for cooperative strategies
to tackle ETS (e.g. to reduce sunk costs and information costs), in similar ways
to what has happened for district based EMAS implementations. The lack
of innovation adoption (di⁄usion) is thus mainly depending on the structural
features of the Italian economy (e.g. small medium sized ￿rms), which adds
up to more general brakes such as ETS development future uncertainty. Other
Italian well known features could mitigate brakes to environmental innovations,
namely cooperative strategies and pooling of policy related management costs,
including the necessary ￿nancial intermediation services. The pooling of sunk
costs might also be helpful to deal with international carbon markets, as clean
development mechanisms, that industry associations tend to support for both
the enhanced investments possibility in emerging countries and the lower carbon
abatement prices. As it is well known, environmental innovation may well be
stimulated and transferred through increased international links, though the
lower resulting prices of quotas is instead a detrimental driver. The need of an
EU ￿ Linkage Directive￿testimonies this risk. The ETS innovation e⁄ect that
includes the role of international markets and ￿rm/sector openness is scope for
future research.
Further research, moreover, could investigate whether the second and third
phases of ETS have and will produce more intense EI adoptions. It will be
challenging to analyze the second phase of ETS that overlapped with the severe
2008-2009 recession and the post crisis fragile economic environment. As far as
our work is concerned, we can a¢ rm that though 2008 is a year within the CIS,
EI were not in￿ uenced by the economic recession that appeared quite late in
2008. The economic and policy dynamics that characterized the ￿rst 5 years of
the century were mostly in￿ uencing EI over 2006-2008. Further research could
also try to merge Italian and other EU countries CIS to enlarge the datasets
and the set of testable implications on both economic and policy grounds.
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24Table 1 – The set of variables used in the analysis
Dependant variables (EI)
Reduction in the use of material per unit of ouput (production phase benefit) ECOMAT
Energy reduction per unit of output (production phase benefit) ECOEN
CO2 reduction (production phase benefit) ECOCO
Energy consumption reduction (use phase benefit) ECOENU
Water, soil and atmospheric emission reduction (use phase benefit) ECOPOS
Material, waste, water recycling (use phase benefit) ECOREA
Independent variables: external factors
Information relevant for innovation received from other firms in the group
1 INF-GROUP
Information relevant for innovation received from suppliers INF- SUPP
Information relevant for innovation received from clients INF-CLIEN 
Information relevant for innovation received from competitors INF-OTHFIR
Information relevant for innovation received from private research centres INF-PRIVRES
Information relevant for innovation received from universities INF-UNIV
Information relevant for innovation received from public research institutions INF-PUBRES
Information relevant for innovation received from fairs and conferences INF-FAIR
Information relevant for innovation received from publications/journals INF-JOURN
Information relevant for innovation received from industrial sector associations INF-ASSOC
Innovation related agreements with other firms and institutions COOPERATION
Part of a business group BUSINESS GROUP
IND. VARIABLES: INTERNAL FACTORS
Growth of sales 2006-2008 SALE_GROWTH
2006 labour productivity level PRODUCTIVITY
Share of exported turnover EXPORT
R&D expenditures per employee R&D
IND. VARIABLES: POLICY FACTORS
Firm belonging to ETS sectors (DE, DF, DI, DJ) D_ETS
Stringency of ETS allocation for the sector ETS -STRINGENCY
The firm received Innovation related public funding during 2006-2008 PUBFUND
1 Dummy takes value 1 if information has high or medium relevance. 




dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
INF-GROUP 0.006 0.52 0.033** 2.29 0.0003 0.03
INF- SUPP 0.047*** 4.01 0.028** 2.27 0.029*** 2.59
INF-CLIEN  0.017 1.45 0.018 1.39 0.008 0.76
INF-OTHFIR 0.009 0.75 0.002 0.15 -0.018 -1.47
INF-PRIVRES -0.015 -1.31 -0.008 -0.68 0.005 0.42
INF-UNIV 0.039* 1.93 0.005 0.25 -0.005 -0.27
INF-PUBRES 0.009 0.39 0.031 1.17 0.055** 2.19
INF-FAIR 0.024* 1.87 0.028** 1.99 0.035*** 2.74
INF-JOURN -0.019 -1.42 -0.011 -0.79 -0.025* -1.93
INF-ASSOC 0.018 1.33 0.015 1.03 0.045*** 3.15
D_ETS 0.019 0.62 0.053 1.55 0.032 1.10
COOPERATION -0.003 -0.23 0.011 0.73 0.003 0.25
TRAIN 0.020* 1.74 0.036*** 2.87 0.027** 2.43
BUSINESS GROUP 0.050*** 4.29 0.038*** 3.05 0.029** 2.55
SALE_GROWTH 0.017 1.27 0.017 1.21 0.012 0.91
PRODUCTIVITY 0.025*** 3.82 0.022*** 3.08 0.024*** 3.86
EXPORT 0.016 1.53 0.016 1.44 0.017* 1.69
R&D 0.001 0.12 -0.004 -0.30 0.017 1.41
PUBFUND 0.003 0.26 0.039*** 2.69 0.024* 1.88
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.056 0.060
Log pseudolikelihood -2537.88 -2844.62 -2478.85
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant al 10%
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INF- SUPP 0.047*** 4.01 0.028** 2.27 0.029*** 2.59
INF-CLIEN  0.017 1.45 0.018 1.39 0.008 0.76
INF-OTHFIR 0.009 0.75 0.002 0.15 -0.018 -1.47
INF-PRIVRES -0.015 -1.31 -0.008 -0.68 0.005 0.42
INF-UNIV 0.039** 1.93 0.005 0.25 -0.005 -0.27
INF-PUBRES 0.009 0.39 0.031 1.17 0.055** 2.19
INF-FAIR 0.024* 1.87 0.020** 1.99 0.035*** 2.74
INF-JOURN -0.019 -1.42 -0.011 -0.79 -0.025* -1.93
INF-ASSOC 0.018 1.33 0.015 1.03 0.045*** 3.15
ETS STRINGENCY -0.016 -1.35 0.004 0.32 -0.006 -0.54
COOPERATION -0.003 -0.23 0.011 0.73 0.003 0.25
TRAIN 0.020* 1.74 0.036*** 2.87 0.027** 2.43
BUSINESS GROUP 0.050*** 4.29 0.038*** 3.05 0.029** 2.55
SALE_GROWTH 0.017 1.27 0.017 1.21 0.012 0.91
PRODUCTIVITY 0.025*** 3.82 0.022*** 3.08 0.024*** 3.86
EXPORT 0.016 1.53 0.016 1.44 0.017* 1.69
R&D 0.001 0.12 -0.004 -0.30 0.017 1.41
PUBFUND 0.003 0.26 0.039*** 2.69 0.024* 1.88
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.056 0.060
Log pseudolikelihood -2537.88 -2844.62 -2478.85
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant al 10%




dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
INF-GROUP 0.048*** 3.07 0.050*** 3.11 0.039*** 2.56
INF- SUPP 0.027** 1.97 0.005 0.37 0.026** 1.98
INF-CLIEN  0.024* 1.76 0.022 1.55 0.007 0.57
INF-OTHFIR 0.006 0.42 0.033** 2.06 0.022 1.49
INF-PRIVRES 0.031** 2.21 0.033** 2.23 0.053*** 3.72
INF-UNIV 0.030 1.31 0.026 1.06 0.013 0.60
INF-PUBRES -0.003 -0.12 0.005 0.17 0.028 1.00
INF-FAIR 0.015 1.05 0.024 1.54 0.031** 2.09
INF-JOURN 0.017 1.02 0.019 1.10 -0.003 -0.24
INF-ASSOC 0.02 1.37 0.026 1.54 0.027 1.64
D_ETS 0.013 0.38 0.078** 2.05 0.069** 2.00
COOPERATION 0.004 0.27 0.016 0.89 0.006 0.37
TRAIN 0.033** 2.47 0.035** 2.54 0.026** 1.99
BUSINESS GROUP 0.020 1.51 0.009 0.68 0.028** 2.11
SALE_GROWTH -0.013 -0.84 0.009 0.58 0.001 0.09
PRODUCTIVITY 0.026*** 3.42 0.019** 2.35 0.014* 1.94
EXPORT 0.018 1.47 -0.002 -0.17 0.008 0.70
R&D 0.027* 1.84 0.027* 1.79 0.013 0.92
PUBFUND 0.012 0.80 -0.001 -0.08 -0.001 -0.10
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.095 0.061
Log pseudolikelihood -3015.03 -3180.27 -3029.50
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant al 10%




dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
INF-GROUP 0.048*** 3.07 0.050*** 3.11 0.039*** 2.56
INF- SUPP 0.027** 1.97 0.005 0.37 0.026** 1.98
INF-CLIEN  0.024* 1.76 0.022 1.55 0.007 0.57
INF-OTHFIR 0.006 0.42 0.033** 2.06 0.022 1.49
INF-PRIVRES 0.031** 2.21 0.033** 2.23 0.053*** 3.72
INF-UNIV 0.030 1.31 0.026 1.06 0.013 0.60
INF-PUBRES -0.003 -0.12 0.005 0.17 0.028 1.00
INF-FAIR 0.015 1.05 0.024 1.54 0.031** 2.09
INF-JOURN 0.017 1.02 0.019 1.10 -0.003 -0.24
INF-ASSOC 0.022 1.37 0.026 1.54 0.027 1.64
ETS STRINGENCY 0.002 0.17 0.041*** 3.02 0.002 0.17
COOPERATION 0.004 0.27 0.016 0.89 0.006 0.37
TRAIN 0.033** 2.47 0.035** 2.54 0.026** 1.99
BUSINESS GROUP 0.020 1.51 0.009 0.68 0.028** 2.11
SALE_GROWTH -0.013 -0.84 0.009 0.58 0.001 0.09
PRODUCTIVITY 0.026*** 3.42 0.019** 2.35 0.014* 1.94
EXPORT 0.018 1.47 -0.002 -0.17 0.008 0.70
R&D 0.027* 1.84 0.027* 1.79 0.013 0.92
PUBFUND 0.012 0.80 -0.001 -0.08 -0.001 -0.10
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.095 0.061
Log pseudolikelihood -3015.03 -3180.27 -3029.50
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant al 10%
5Appendix
Table A.1 – Classification of manufacturing activities 
Codes Description
DA Food products, beverages and tobacco
DB Textile and clothing
DC Leather and leather products
DD Wood and wood products
DE
Pulp, paper, and paper products, publishing and 
printing
DF Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
DG
Chemicals, chemical products, and man-made 
fibres
DH Rubber and plastic products
DI Non-metallic mineral products
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products
DK Machinery and equipment 
DL Electrical and optical equipment
DM Transport equipment
DN Other manufacturing  
6